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Abstract—To devise efficient approaches and tools for detecting
malicious packages in the Android ecosystem, researchers are
increasingly required to have a deep understanding of malware.
There is thus a need to provide a framework for dissecting
malware and locating malicious program fragments within app
code in order to build a comprehensive dataset of malicious
samples. Towards addressing this need, we propose in this work a
tool-based approach called HookRanker, which provides ranked
lists of potentially malicious packages based on the way malware
behaviour code is triggered. With experiments on a ground truth
set of piggybacked apps, we are able to automatically locate
the malicious packages from piggybacked Android apps with an
accuracy of 83.6% in verifying the top five reported items.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware is pervasive in the Android ecosystem. This is
unfortunate since Android is the most widespread operating
system in handheld devices and has increasing market shares in
various smart home and office appliances. As we now heavily
depend on mobile apps in various activities that pervade our
modern lives, security issues with Android web browsers,
media players, games, social networking or productivity apps
can have severe consequences. Yet, regularly, high profile
security mishaps with the Android platform shine the spotlight
on how easily malware writers can exploit a large attack
surface, eluding all detection systems both at the app store
level and at the device level.
Nonetheless, research and practice on malware detection
have produced a substantial number of approaches and tools
for addressing malware. The literature contains a large body
of such works [1], [2], [3], [4]. Unfortunately, the proliferation
of malware [5] in stores and on user devices is a testimony
that 1) state-of-the-art approaches have not matured enough
to significantly address malware, and 2) malware writers
are still able to react quickly to the capabilities of current
detection techniques. Broadly, malware detection techniques
either leverage malware signatures or they build machine
learning (ML) classifiers based on static/dynamic features [6].
On the one hand, it is rather tedious to manually build a (near)
exhaustive database of malware signatures: new malware or
modified malware is thus likely to slip through. On the other
hand, ML classifiers are too generic to be relevant in the
wild: features currently used in the literature, such as n-
grams, permissions or system calls, allow to flag apps without
providing any hint on either which malicious actions are
actually detected, or where they are located in the app.
The challenges in Android malware detection are mainly
due to the lack of accurate understanding of what consti-
tutes a malicious code. In 2012, Zhou and Jiang [7] have
manually investigated 1260 malware samples to characterize
1) their installation process, i.e., which social engineering-
based techniques (e.g., repackaging [8], [9], [10]) are used to
slip them into users devices; 2) their activation process, i.e.,
which events (e.g., SMS_RECEIVED) are used to trigger the
malicious behaviour; 3) the category of malicious packages
(e.g., privilege escalation or personal information stealing);
and 4) how malware exploits the permission system. The
produced dataset named MalGenome, has opened several
directions in the research of malware detection, most of which
have either focused on detecting specific malware types (e.g.,
malware leaking private data [11], [12], [13]), or are exploiting
features such as permissions in ML classification [14]. The
MalGenome dataset however has shown its limitations in hunt-
ing for malware: the dataset, which was built manually, has
become obsolete as new malware families are now prevalent;
and the characterization provided in the study is too high-level
to allow for the inference of meaningful structural or semantic
features of malware.
The ultimate goal of our work is to build an approach
towards systematizing the dissection of Android malware
and automating the collection of malicious code packages
in Android apps. Previous studies have exposed statistical
facts which suggest that malware writing is performed at an
“industrial” scale and that a given malicious piece of code can
be extensively reused in a bulk of malware [15], [5]. Malware
writers can indeed simply unpack a benign, preferably popular
app, and then graft some malicious code on it before finally
repackaging it. The resulting app, which thus piggybacks
malicious packages, is referred to as a piggybacked app [16].
Our assumption that most malware are piggybacked of benign
apps is confirmed with the MalGenome dataset where over
80% of the samples were built through repackaging. For
simplicity, in this entire paper we refer to any code package
injected via piggybacking as a “malicious” package1.
1This package may directly contribute to implementing the malicious
behaviour, or further to hiding malicious actions to static analyzers, or may
simply include library code leveraged by piggybackers.
Accurately identifying and extracting malicious code in
an app is however a challenging endeavour. In any case, a
malicious behaviour can be implemented as an orchestration
of different behaviour phases in several packages. To the best
of our knowledge, the literature does not include any approach
for systematically identifying packages which are responsible
for the malicious behaviour of a malware. We propose in
this work a step towards helping analysts readily identify
malicious packages in Android apps. To that end, we build
HookRanker, a ranking approach which orders packages with
regards to the likelihood of their malicious status. Overall, we
make the following contributions:
• We propose an automated approach for locating hooks
(i.e., code that switches the execution context from be-
nign to malicious code) within piggybacked apps. Our
approach eventually yields a ranked list of most probable
malicious packages, which can benefit malware analysts
to quickly understand how the malicious behaviour is
implemented and how the malicious code is triggered.
A key characteristic of our approach is that it does
not require access to the original benign version of the
piggybacked app, which is usually hard to harvest, in
order to perform some form of diff analysis.
• We present a tool called HookRanker to automatically
recommend potential malicious packages. Evaluation on a
set of benchmark apps has demonstrated that HookRanker
is efficient to locate malicious packages of piggybacked
apps.
II. HOOK TAXONOMY
We now introduce the necessary terminology to which we
will refer in the remainder of this paper. Figure 1 shows the
constituting parts of a piggybacked malware2, which is built
by taking a given original app, referred to in the literature as
the carrier [17], and grafting to it malicious packages (also
known as a piece of malicious code3), referred to as the rider.
The malicious behaviour will be triggered thanks to the hook
that is inserted by the malware writer to ensure the injected
packages will be executed.
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Fig. 1. Piggybacking Terminology [18].
2In this work, we focus on piggybacked malicious apps, where the status
of each app has been confirmed by the results of VirusTotal.
3To simplify the description, in this work, we consider all the injected code
as malicious, even if the actual malicious payload is only some part of the
added code.
By investigating into the Android app launch model, we
observe that there are two ways for piggybackers to hook
their malicious code from the carrier code: i.e., to allow the
triggering of the payload in their injected malicious packages.
We refer to these two ways as type1 and type2 hooks:
1 //Type 1 hook, through method invocation
2 public class UnityPlayerProxyActivity extends
android.app.Activity {
3 protected void onCreate(android.os.Bundle) {
4 specialinvoke $r0.onCreate($r1);
5 + staticinvoke Touydig.init($r0);
6 $r2 = newarray (java.lang.String)[2];
7 }}
8 //Type 2 hook, through Broadcast Receiver
9 + public class UR extends AdPushReceiver {...}
Listing 1. An Example of Type1 and Type2 Hook. This Snippet is
Extracted from a Real Piggybacked App Named apscallion.sharq2. The
‘+’ Sign Indicates the Code that Was Injected into the Origin App.
Type1 hook involves method calls that explicitly connect
carrier code to rider code. In this case, we identify the
hook via the point where carrier code is switched into the
rider code in the execution flow. Listing 1 shows a snippet
illustrating an example of type1 hook (line 5), which is inserted
immediately at the beginning of the onCreate() method (line
4) of component UnityPlayerProxyAct. By calling the hook
method (i.e., init()), the malicious packages (starting from
class com.gamegod.Touydig) will immediately be triggered
and thereby switching the current execution context to pig-
gybacked code.
Type2 hook involves the use of the Android event system.
Thus, the piggybacked code hooking is done via a component
that is not explicitly connected to any code of the original app.
On the contrary, the (malicious) rider code will be triggered
directly by system or user-defined events.
Based on our observation, piggybacked apps often feature
both type1 and type2 hooks to ensure the execution of their
malicious payloads. In this work, we tame type1 hook only
and keep type2 hook as our future work. Our objective in
this work is thus to automatically locate suspicious method
calls for a given piggybacked malicious app and thereby to
systematically extract malicious payloads that are injected into
the piggybacked app.
III. HOOK IDENTIFICATION
Our primary objective of this work is to provide researchers
and practitioners with means to systematize the collection
of malicious packages that are used frequently by malware
writers. To that end, we propose to devise an approach for au-
tomating the identification of malicious code snippets which
are used pervasively in malware distributed as piggybacked
apps. We are thus interested in identifying malicious rider
code as well as the hook code which triggers the malicious
behaviour in rider code. To fulfil this objective we require
a set of reliable metrics to automatically identify malicious
packages within a detected piggybacked app. To the best of
our knowledge, in the literature, there are no such works that
have addressed this before.
To automate the identification approach, we consider the
identification of type1 hook as a graph analysis problem.
Figure 2 illustrates the package dependency graph (PDGraph)
of a piggybacked app (the same app as we used in Listing 1).
PDGraph is a directed graph which makes explicit the depen-
dency between packages. The values reported on the edges
correspond to the number of times a call is made by code
from a package A to a method in package B. These values
are considered as the weights of the relationships between
packages. In some cases however, this static weight may
not reflect the relationship strength between packages since
a unique call link between two packages can be used multiple
times at runtime. To attenuate the importance of the weight
we also consider a scenario where weights are simply ignored.
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Fig. 2. Package Dependency Graph of a Piggybacked app.
We now compute four metrics for estimating the relation-
ships between packages in an app:
1) weighted indegree: In a directed graph, the indegree of
a vertex is the number of edges pointing to the vertex.
In the PDGraph, the weighted indegree of a package
corresponds to the number of calls that are made from
code in other packages to methods in that package.
2) unweighted indegree: We compute the normal indegree
of a package in the PDGraph by counting the number
of packages that call its methods. The reason why we
take into account indegree as a metric is based on the
assumption that hackers take the least effort to present
the hook. As an example, com.gamegod in Figure 2 is
actually the entry point of the rider code, which has
the smallest indegree for both weighted and unweighted
indegree.
3) maximum shortest path: Given a package, we compute
the shortest path to every other package, then we con-
sider the longest path to reach any vertex. The intuition
behind this metric is based on our investigation with
samples of piggybacked apps which shows that malware
writers usually hide malicious actions far away from the
hook, i.e., multiple call jumps from the triggering call.
Thus, the maximum shortest path in rider module can
be significantly higher than in carrier code.
4) energy: we estimate the energy of a vertex (package
in the PDGraph) as an iterative sum of its weighted
outdegrees and that of its adjacent packages. Thus, the
energy of a package is total sum weight of all packages
that can be reached from its code. The energy value
helps to evaluate the importance of a package in the
stability of a graph (i.e., how relevant is the sub-graph
rooted at this package?).
The above metrics are useful for identifying packages which
are entry-points into the rider code. We build a ranked list of
the packages based on a likelihood score that a package is
the entry point package of the rider code. Let vi be the value
computed for a metric i described above (i = 1, 2 for in-degree
metrics, the smaller the better; i = 3, 4 for others, the bigger
the better), and wi the weight associated to metric i. For a
PDGraph graph with n package nodes, the score associated
to a package p, with our proposed metrics, is provided by
formula (1).
sp =
2∑
i=1
wi∗(1−
vi(p)∑n−1
j=0 vi(j)
)+
4∑
i=3
wi∗(
vi(p)∑n−1
j=0 vi(j)
) (1)
In our experiments, we weight all metrics equally (i.e.,
∀i, wi = 1). For each ranked package pr, the potential rider
code is constituted by all packages that are reachable from
pr. A hook is generally a method invocation from the carrier
code to the rider code. Thus, we consider a type1 hook as
the relevant pair of packages that are interconnected in the
PDGraph.
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Fig. 3. A Partial PDGraph Showing a Set of Related Packages in the Carrier
Code of com.gilpstudio.miniinimo.
Finally, to increase accuracy in the detection of hooks we
further dismiss such packages (in stand-alone hooks or in
package-pair hooks) whose nodes in the PDGraph do not meet
the following constraints:
• No closed walk: Because rider code and carrier code
are loosely connected, we consider that a hook cannot
be part of a directed cycle (i.e., a sequence of vertices
going from one vertex and ending on the same vertex
in a closed walk). Otherwise, we will have several false
positives, since typically, in a benign app module (i.e.,
a set of related packages written for a single purpose),
packages in the PDGraph are usually involved in closed
walks as in the example of Figure 3.
• Limited clustering coefficient: A hook must be viewed
as the connection link between carrier code and rider code
via two packages. Since both packages belong to different
(malicious and benign) parts of the app, they should not
tend to cluster together in the package dependency graph
as it would otherwise suggest that they are tightly coupled
in the design of the app. To implement this constraint we
measure the local clustering coefficient [19] of the vertex
representing the carrier entry package. This coefficient
quantifies how close its adjacent vertices are to being a
clique (i.e., forming a complete graph). Given v, a vertex,
and n, the number of its neighbors, its coefficient cc(v)
is constrained by formula (2).
cc(v)
{
<
C2
n−1
C2
n
, n ≥ 2
= 0, n < 2
(2)
IV. EVALUATION
We now evaluate our approach that automates the dissection
of piggybacked malware to identify rider and hook code. Our
evaluation aims at answering the following research questions:
RQ 1: How are type1 hooks distributed in piggybacked
apps?
RQ 2: Is our proposed metrics capable of locating type1
hooks in piggybacked Android apps? If so, what is the
accuracy?
Experimental Setup. The experiments of this work are con-
ducted on a benchmark of piggybacking pairs provided by Li
et al. [15]. Because of some corner cases, where our tool fails
to rank the potential hooks, we eventually consider a set of
500 pairs from which we could build a benchmark for our
evaluation.
A. RQ1 - Distribution
Fig. 4 illustrates the distribution of piggybacked apps on
type1 hooks, where the median number of type1 hook for
the investigated apps is one. Among the 500 investigated
piggybacked apps, 159 (32%) of them do not contain any
type1 hook, while the majority of piggybacked apps (54%)
contains only one type1 hook. This distribution demonstrates
that piggybackers attempts to change as less as possible (one
method call for over half of the investigated cases) for the
original app in order to trigger the execution of their injected
payloads.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of Type1 Hooks.
B. RQ2 - Hook Identification
The output of our hook identification approach, namely
HookRanker, is a ranked list of hooks (packages which en-
compass sufficient information for analysts to quickly locate
the relevant pair of packages that are interconnected in the
PDGraph. For simplicity, we only consider packages in this
work.). Our evaluation consists in verifying the percentage of
hooks in the top 5 items (i.e., accuracy@5) in the list that are
correctly identified.
To support the verification, we first automatically build
the baseline of comparison by computing the diff between
each of the selected piggybacked apps and its corresponding
original app. With this diff, we can identify the rider code
and the hook. Then, we apply our dissection approach by
only considering the piggybacked apps4, and compare the
top ranked packages against the baseline. Our verification
is performed in two cases: Match Any Hook and Match All
Hooks. In the case of Match Any Hook, where we consider an
app verified as long as one of its hooks is located, HookRanker
yields an accuracy@5 (we check the top 5 packages) of 89.4%
for type1 hook. In the case of Match All Hooks, where we
consider an app is verified if and only if all of its hooks
are located, HookRanker yields an accuracy@5 of 83.6% for
type1 hook. For such apps that have more than five hooks, we
consider them to be not verified.
Our manual analysis on the dissecting results further pro-
vided some insights into how malware writers perform pig-
gybacking at a large scale. Table I presents five samples
of type1 hook at the package level. It shows that some
malicious packages are repeatedly injected into (different)
Android apps. For example, com.google.ads, an ad-related
package, has been injected into seven benign apps while
package com.fivefeiwo.coverscreen.SR appears in 50 distinct
piggybacked apps. This repeating phenomenon suggests that
piggybacking could be performed in batches.
Now, let us look one step deeper into the frequency of
injected type1 hooks (in Table I): piggybackers often connect
their packages to the carrier via one of its included
libraries. Thus, malware can systematize the piggybacking
operation by targeting apps that use some popular libraries. For
example, package com.unity3d.player is the infection
point in 65 (out of the 500) piggybacked apps. In 12 of those
apps, the entry package of the rider code is com.gamegod.
TABLE I
TYPE1 HOOK SAMPLES AND THEIR AFFECTED NUMBER OF APPS.
Type1 Hook Apps (#.)
com.unity3d.player → com.gamegod 12
com.unity3d.player → com.google.ads 7
com.unity3d.player → com.basyatw.bcpawsen 5
com.ansca.corona → com.google.ads 3
com.g5e → com.geseng 2
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed in this paper an approach for dissecting
piggybacked apps to locate and collect malicious samples.
Through extensive evaluations, we have demonstrated the
performance of our approach, i.e., the precision of locating
hook/rider code. We have also experimentally shown that
piggybacking could be conducted in batches and piggybackers
often connect their malicious payloads to the carrier via one
of its included libraries.
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